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COP-WATCH: AN ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHT TO RECORD
POLICE ACTIVITY AND ITS LIMITS
Raoul Shah
I.

INTRODUCTION
Over the last year, the news headlines blaring that a police officer’s

potentially inappropriate actions were recorded have become almost too familiar.
The social climate has shifted to one where much of the historic trust that was
placed in police officers has become questioned following the events in Ferguson,
Missouri, and Staten Island, New York. The timing of this social climate shift has
lined up perfectly with the prominence of smart-phones that are capable of
recording high definition videos and sound recording. However, police have also
historically cited to wiretap laws, which were intended to protect citizens from
being recorded without consent, as a basis to arrest citizens for videotaping police
activity.1
The issue of whether or not there is an established constitutional right to
record police activity has arisen on various occasions without a definitive
answer.2 In Rivera v. Foley, Pedro Rivera heard that there had been a serious car
accident and went out to the scene with his own drone.3 The drone had been set
up to “record visual images of the accident scene.”4 Rivera was standing outside
of the scene of the accident and observing the officers responding to the call, and

1

Michael Potere, Who Will Watch the Watchmen? Citizens Recording Police Conduct, 106 NW.
U. L. Rev. 273 (2012).
2
Rivera v. Foley, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35639, at *24 (2d Cir. Mar. 23, 2015).
3
Id. at *3.
4
Id.
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flew his drone about one hundred and fifty feet over the accident scene. 5 Some of
the uniformed officers came over and asked Rivera to identify himself and what
he was doing.6 Rivera informed them that he was a photographer for a television
station, but that he was not acting in that capacity at the time although he on
occasion would forward video footage from the drone to the television station.7
The officers demanded that Rivera quit operating the drone and leave, even
though he was not violating any laws.8 The officers also called Rivera’s
supervisors at work to complain that Rivera was interfering with a police
investigation, and as a result, Rivera was suspended from work for one week.9
Rivera then sued, alleging that the officers’ actions violated his First and Fourth
Amendment rights.10
The police officers claimed, among other things, that their conduct was
protected by qualified immunity.11 Qualified immunity protects municipal officers
from being liable as individuals under a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights claim when
they were engaged in “discretionary functions.”12 Qualified immunity exists “to
protect officials when they must make difficult ‘on-the-job’ decisions.”13 The
threshold inquiry to determine if qualified immunity is applicable is whether the
officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right given the specific context of that

5

Id.
Id. at *3-*4.
7
Id. at *4.
8
Id. at *4-*5.
9
Id. at *5-*6.
10
Id. at *6.
11
Id. at *13.
12
Id. (quoting Williams v. Lopes, 64 F. Supp. 2d 37, 41 (D. Conn. 1999)).
13
Rivera, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35639 at *13-*14 (quoting Alto v. Anthony, 782 F. Supp. 2d 4, 8
(D. Conn. 2011)).
6
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case.14 If it appears that the official conduct did violate a constitutional right, the
second prong of the test is to determine if that right is one that has been clearly
established, such that the unlawfulness of the conduct would be apparent “in light
of the pre-existing law.”15 Only if the conduct is found to have violated a clearly
established constitutional right will a claim under § 1983 not be barred by
qualified immunity.
The discussion in Rivera v. Foley included an analysis of whether “the
right to photograph and record police officers who are engaged in an ongoing
investigation was clearly established as a matter of constitutional law” at the time
of the incident in question.16 The District Court for Connecticut held that because
there had been a split between the other circuit courts as to whether or not such a
right was clearly established, Rivera’s recording of the police officers’ activity
was not protected and the officers were entitled to qualified immunity.17 The court
went one step further and said that even if the right had been clearly established,
Rivera’s use of a drone surpassed other cases where recording was all done from a
handheld device and thus would not have been protected anyway.18
This article will advance the argument that the courts should find in future
cases that the right to record police activity has been clearly established as a
constitutional right, but that use of a drone to record police activity should not be
recognized as a constitutional right. In Part II, this article will discuss the current
split between the circuit courts as to whether recording police activity is a clearly
14

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 150 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2001)).
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739, 122 S. Ct. 2508, 153 L. Ed. 2d 666 (2002)).
16
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35639 at *24.
17
Id.
18
Id. at *25-*26.
15
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established constitutional right. Part III of this article will discuss the extent of the
First Amendment as established by the United States Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence over time. Part IV of this article will discuss the right to record
police activity in light of the case law regarding the First Amendment. The article
will conclude that the right to record police activity is a clearly established
constitutional right when a handheld device is used but use of a drone may be
beyond the scope of that right.

II.

CONFLICT BETWEEN CIRCUITS
The District Court for the District of Connecticut identified that the Circuit

Courts of Appeals have been split as to whether or not the right to record police
activity is a constitutional right that is clearly established such that it can defeat a
claim of qualified immunity when an officer inhibits those actions. 19 The First,
Seventh, Eleventh, and Ninth Circuits have all held that the right to photograph
and record police officers in the performance of their duties is protected under the
First Amendment.20 The Third Circuit and the Fourth Circuit, however, have all
denied the existence of such a right.21
a. Circuits that Recognize the Right to Record Police Activity
The First Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue in a case arising out
of actions that took place in October of 2007.22 Glik saw three police officers
arresting a young man and, out of concern that the officers were using excessive

19

Id. at *24.
Id.
21
Id.
22
Glik v. Cunniffe, , 655 F.3d 78, 79 (1st Cir. 2011).
20
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force, started to take video on his cell phone from approximately ten feet away.23
One of the officers asked if Glik was also recording audio and when Glik stated
that he was, the officer arrested Glik for a violation of the wiretap law and
confiscated the cell phone.24 The charges against him were later dismissed, and
Glik filed a civil rights action against the officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging
that his First and Fourth Amendment rights were violated.25 The officers claimed
that they were entitled to qualified immunity on the grounds that there was no
established constitutional right to record police officers.26
The district court denied the motion to dismiss.27 On appeal, the First
Circuit Court of Appeals held that based on principles from United States
Supreme Court case law, they had already recognized a prior case that “the
videotaping of public officials is an exercise of First Amendment liberties.”28 The
court also stated that it did not matter that this was a private individual rather than
a reporter recording the events because the First Amendment extends to the
public, not just the press.29
In ACLU v. Alvarez, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals was asked to
consider whether an eavesdropping statute was unconstitutional for impinging on
citizens’ First Amendment rights.30 The court reasoned that courts have not
“seriously questioned that the processes of writing words down on paper, painting
23

Id. at 79-80.
Id. at 80.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 83; see Iacobucci v. Boulter, 193 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that when a journalist
films public officials in a peaceful, law abiding manner, in an exercise of his First Amendment
rights, police officers do not have the authority to stop him).
29
Glik, 655 F.3d. at 83-84; see also Part III(b)(i), infra.
30
679 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2011).
24
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a picture, and playing an instrument are purely expressive activities entitled to full
First Amendment protection.”31 Although those acts can be broken down into
specific acts that would not be considered speech under the common definition,
such as forming each line of a letter or an individual stroke of the paintbrush, the
court has “not attempted to disconnect the end product from the act of creation.”32
Thus, “the act of making an audio or audiovisual recording is necessarily included
within the First Amendment’s guarantee of speech and press rights as a corollary
of the right to disseminate the resulting recording.”33 The Seventh Circuit easily
extended these arguments to audio and visual recordings because they, like
painting and writing, are methods of enabling speech.34 The court held that these
principles were universally accepted, and thus established under the First
Amendment rights.35
The Eleventh Circuit in Smith v. City of Cumming reviewed a case where
summary judgment had been granted to the City and police chief on a 42 U.S.C. §
1983 claim.36 The court held that there was no doubt that the Smiths had a right to
record police activity that was subject to “reasonable time, manner, and place
restrictions.”37 However, the court denied review in a per curiam decision
because the Smiths failed to show that the conduct by the police or City deprived

31

Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1061-62 (9th Cir. 2010).
Id.
33
ACLU, 679 F.3d at 595.
34
Id. at 597.
35
Id.
36
212 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 2000).
37
Id.
32

221

Vol. 37.1

them of that right in their complaint.38 Nonetheless, the Eleventh Circuit held that
whether the right to record police activity was not at issue in that case.
The case from the Ninth Circuit referred to by the Rivera court did not
explicitly say that there was a right to record police activity specifically, but could
be interpreted as such. In that case, Jerry Fordyce had volunteered to videotape a
demonstration for broadcast on a public television channel.39 The police officers
present at the demonstration, who were also subjected to being recorded, were not
pleased by the recording and tried to physically prevent him from recording.40
Specifically, Fordyce alleged that he was assaulted when a police officer grabbed
his camera and smashed it into his face.41 This incident was recorded by the video
camera.42 Fordyce was ultimately arrested for videotaping two boys after the adult
who was with them asked him to stop, pursuant to a Washington statute that
forbade recording private conversations without consent.43 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the officers were protected by qualified immunity as to
the arrest, since they had a reasonable belief that Fordyce had committed a
misdemeanor by recording the boys.44 However, the court remanded because
there were still genuine issues of fact as to whether Fordyce was assaulted by the
officers prior to that in an attempt to dissuade him from exercising his First
Amendment rights.45 This holding could be taken to mean that there is a First

38

Id. at 1333.
Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 438 (9th Cir. 1995).
40
Id.
41
Id. at 439.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 439-40.
45
Id. at 439.
39
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Amendment right to record police activity in public that officers may not try to
dissuade citizens from exercising.

b. Circuits that Deny the Right to Record Police Activity
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals denied that the right to record police
activity during a traffic stop was well established as a constitutional right under
the First Amendment.46 In Kelly, the court found that the case law was insufficient
to support a conclusion that competent officers would have fair notice that
arresting someone for recording police activity would be a violation of their First
Amendment rights.47 Although some of the court’s jurisprudence declared that
there was a right to record police activity, other cases decided by the court held
that there may need to be an express purpose in order to have a video recording be
protected under the First Amendment.48 Further, the court had denied that
recording a public meeting was protected under the First Amendment.49
Therefore, the court held that there was not a clearly established constitutional
right to record all police activity such that police officers would be aware that
impeding a citizen from recording would infringe upon constitutional
protections.50
In Szymecki v. Houck, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals similarly ruled
that there was not a clearly established right to record police activity in that
46

Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 262 (3d Cir. 2010).
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
47
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circuit.51 The court stated that when determining if a right is clearly established, it
need only look at decisions made by the Supreme Court, the Circuit Court of
Appeals, and the highest court from the state where the case was originally
from.52 It went on to hold in a per curiam decision that after reviewing the record
and legal authorities, it seemed clear to them that police officers were protected
by qualified immunity for stopping citizens from recording their activities because
in that circuit the right to record police activity was not clearly established.53

III.

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
a. The First Amendment and its Purpose
The Founding Fathers of the United States of America established that

“Congress shall make no law […] abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.”54 The United States Supreme Court has
interpreted the First Amendment as a means to allow citizens to collect and
distribute information and prohibiting the government from limiting the
information that is available to the public.55 This right is to collect and distribute
information is particularly important when it relates to government actions.56 The
government would potentially have a great incentive in and motive to repressing
opposition, and carries the power to suppress what information is available.57

51

353 Fed. Appx. 852 (4th Cir. 2009).
Id.
53
Id. at 853.
54
U.S. const., Amend I.
55
First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783, 98 S. Ct. 1407, 55 L. Ed. 2d 707 (1978).
56
Id. at 777.
57
Id.
52
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Thus, the prohibition against the government exercising that power to suppress
certain information that it finds unfavorable is crucial.58
The First Amendment specifically mentions that the freedom of the press
should not be abridged.59 This allows the press to gather news from any source, as
long as it is done in a lawful manner.60 The amendment was included in the Bill
of Rights with the intent that it would protect free discussion about the
government’s affairs and allow debate over public issues to be uninhibited.61
Allowing the press to gather information on government officials in a way that
can be made public is protected because it promotes that “free discussion of
governmental affairs” and allows for information regarding public issues to be
distributed more widely.62
A public interest in governmental affairs includes an interest in law
enforcement action.63 Free discussion regarding law enforcement’s use of
discretion, and whether it was used appropriately, is of great significance to the
public interest since law enforcement officials could use that discretion to inhibit
liberties of the citizens.64 Since issues regarding law enforcement’s use of
discretion is important to the public interest, access to information about it

58

Id.
U.S. const., Amend. I.
60
Houchins v. KOED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 98 S. Ct. 2588, 57 L. Ed. 2d 553 (1978).
61
Ariz. Free. Enter. Club’s Freedom Fund PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2828-29, 180 L. Ed.
2d 664 (2011).
62
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218, 86 S. Ct. 1434, 16 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1966).
63
Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1035-36, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 115 L. Ed. 2d 888
(1991).
64
Id.
59
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through the press was intended to be protected by the First Amendment as part of
the “free discussion of governmental affairs.”65
b. Evolution of the First Amendment Doctrines
i. Extension from the Press to the Public
While the First Amendment explicitly mentions a freedom of the press, it
also includes language about freedom of speech generally and how other rights of
the people, such as the right to petition the government for redress, are not to be
inhibited.66 The Supreme Court has interpreted this to mean that the public has a
right regarding access to information, including collection and distribution, which
exists concurrently with the right of the press.67 The rights of the press are not
special or exclusive for information that is not generally available to the public.68
States have very “sharply circumscribed” limits that may be placed on First
Amendment rights to collect and distribute information in public spaces.69 Since
the public has a right that exists simultaneously with the right of the press, the
public is also entitled to gather information that advances the free and open
discussion of government affairs so long as it is done by lawful means. 70 It would
naturally follow that the public’s right to gather information about government
affairs also includes a right to gather information about law enforcement’s use of
discretion for the same reasons that the press is entitled to.71
ii. Use of Recording Devices
65

Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Fund PAC, 131 S. Ct. at 2828-29.
U.S. const., Amend. I.
67
Houchins, 438 U.S. at 16, 98 S. Ct. 2588.
68
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684, 92 S. Ct. 2646, 44 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1972).
69
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S. Ct. 948, 74 L. Ed.
2d 794 (1983).
70
Houchins, 438 U.S. at 1, 98 S. Ct. 2588.
71
Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1035-36, 111 S. Ct. 2720.
66
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The issue that appeared in Rivera is whether or not the right to use a
recording device is a constitutional one that has been clearly established; not just
whether the public has a right to gather information about law enforcement
activity.72 Recording, whether by video, photograph, or audio, is considered a
type of expression that is commonly used to preserve and distribute information
and ideas.73 When regulations are placed on a mode of expression that ultimately
will affect the quality of the communication itself down the line. 74 Using
recording to preserve and later distribute information and ideas is a type of
expression that is “included within the free speech and free press guaranty of the
First” Amendment that has been made binding on the states by means of the
Fourteenth Amendment.75
iii. The Right to Criticize Law Enforcement Officials
Included in the First Amendment protections granted to the people of the
United States is the right to peacefully criticize law enforcement in the
performance of their duties.76 This guarantee is a “principal characteristic by
which we distinguish a free nation from a police state.”77 The Supreme Court has
explained that peaceful criticism has a high value in a free society and provides a
check on state power, and thus is deserving of protection.78
This right, however, is not one without conditions. Criticism of law
enforcement’s performance of their duties loses its protection when it forms “no
72

2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35639 at *24.
Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502, 77 S. Ct. 777, 96 L. Ed. 1098 (1952).
74
City of Lague v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 48, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 129 L. Ed. 2d 36 (1994).
75
Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 502.
76
City of Houston, Texas v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461, 107 S. Ct. 2502, 96 L. Ed. 2d 398.
77
Id. at 462-63.
78
Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 109, 92 S. Ct. 1953, 32 L. Ed. 2d 584 (1972).
73
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essential part of any exposition of ideas and [is] of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from [the criticism] is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”79 In other words,
criticism that is not founded in fact or does not advance public discussion but
rather seeks only to undermine and mark the image of law enforcement might not
be protected under the First Amendment.80
Further, certain types of criticism directed at law enforcement may be
unprotected under the First Amendment because it obstructs and investigation or
jeopardizes officer safety.81 By virtue of their position in society and the
government, “officers [are] entitled to enforce [the law] free from possible
interference or interruption from bystanders.”82 Engaging in criticism that creates
an obstruction to law enforcement or endangers the officers while performing
their duties has a low social value when compared to the state’s valid interest in
the maintenance of public order.83 Therefore, criticism of the police in a way that
interferes with or creates danger to law enforcement will not be protected under
the First Amendment. As a result of these Supreme Court decisions, whether a
specific instance of exercising the right to criticize law enforcement will be
protected turns on if that criticism was done in a peaceful manner as opposed to
one that obstructed or endangered law enforcement officers.

IV.

ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHT
a. Right to Record Police Activity with Handheld Devices

79

Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572, 62 S. Ct. 766, 86 L. Ed. 1041 (1942).
Id.
81
Colten, 407 U.S. at 109, 92 S. Ct. 1953.
82
Id.
83
Id.
80
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Given the line of reasoning passed down by the United States Supreme
Court regarding protected First Amendment rights, it would appear that the
Second Circuit erred in holding that there is no clearly established right to record
police activity with a handheld device such as a cell phone. While there has been
a split amongst the Circuit Courts of Appeals, the reasoning required to make the
right to record police activity a constitutional one has been previously decided by
the United States Supreme Court. Since the basis has been so clearly passed down
from the highest court, the Courts of Appeals should have also found that the right
is clearly established and thus a claim under § 1983 would not be barred by
qualified immunity. So far, the Eighth Circuit has yet to encounter a case where it
will have to determine whether there is a clearly established constitutional right to
record police activity with a handheld device. However, when the opportunity
arises the Eighth Circuit should hold that this right has been clearly established as
our understanding of the First Amendment has evolved.
The United States Supreme Court has established conclusively that the
freedom of the press mentioned in the First Amendment includes the right for the
press to gather information by any lawful means.84 The purpose behind this is for
the media to consolidate and distribute that information for the public to be aware
of and to hold the government accountable.85 This right has been extended to
private citizens in the United States as well.86
Even if this right had not been clearly extended to private citizens, in this
day and age the advances in technology “have made the lines between private
84

See Part III(a), infra.
Id.
86
See Part III(b)(i), infra.
85
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citizen and journalist exceedingly difficult to draw.”87 People everywhere have
cell phones that are capable of recording like a “traditional film crew” would have
done in the past.88 In modern times, “news stories are now just as likely to be
broken by a blogger at her computer as a reporter at a major newspaper.”89 It is
clear that it is no longer feasible to protect the right to gather and distribute
information under the First Amendment solely based on a profession or
credentials.90
Further, the Supreme Court has stated that people should be allowed to
criticize law enforcement officers in the performance of their duties so long as the
criticism does not interfere with the performance of those duties or endanger the
lives of the officers in the process.91 This allows the state’s interest in the
maintenance of order to prevail over an individual person’s criticism of the
police.92 At the same time, this allows the United States to be a democratic society
rather than a police state.93 By allowing the use of recording devices and allowing
the public to criticize law enforcement, the Supreme Court has ensured that the
free speech rights have been adequately protected, and by requiring that these
actions take place in a lawful manner, peacefully, and in a way that does not
interfere with an investigation or endangers officer safety, the jurisprudence has
adequately balanced those rights with the government’s interest in an orderly
society.
87

Glik, 655 F.3d at 84.
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Colten, 407 U.S. at 109, 92 S. Ct. 1953.
92
Id.
93
City of Houston, Texas v. Hill, 482 U.S. at 462-63, 107 S. Ct. 2502.
88
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Although the Third Circuit in Kelly found that there was not an established
constitutional right to record police activity, the facts of that case were that the
recording was taken during a traffic stop.94 This differs from most scenarios, such
as the one presented in Glik where the recording was made from a distance while
officers were arresting another individual.95 A traffic stop is a situation that differs
in many significant ways from an arrest in a public place. 96 The United States
Supreme Court itself has consistently acknowledged “the inordinate risk
confronting an officer as he approaches a person seated in an automobile.”97 The
court in Mimms referenced a study that stated that about thirty percent of police
shootings took place as an officer was approaching a suspect who was sitting in
an automobile.98 Another study had found “that a significant percentage of
murders of police officers occurs when the officers are making traffic stops.”99
Thus, the Third Circuit could have distinguished their finding from those of the
other circuits by citing to the danger to officers inherent in traffic stops. This
would still allow for a constitutional right to record police activity in other public
places.
Any restriction placed on a constitutional right that encroaches on personal
liberty is usually subject to strict scrutiny.100 In order to survive the strict scrutiny
test, a limitation on the constitutional right to free speech must serve a compelling

94

Kelly, 622 F.3d at 262.
Glik, 655 F.3d at 80.
96
Id. at 85.
97
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110, 98 S.Ct. 330, 333, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977).
98
Id. (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148 n. 3 (1972).
99
Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110, 98 S.Ct. at 333 (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234
n.5 (1973).
100
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497, 85 S. Ct. 1678, 14 L. Ed. 2d 510 (1965) (citing
Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524, 80 S. Ct. 412, 4 L. Ed. 2d 480 (1960)).
95
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government interest and be narrowly tailored to meet that compelling interest.101
The Kelly decision would still be found to comport with this and thus be valid.
There is no doubt that the government has a compelling interest in law
enforcement officer safety.102 Since it has been well established that traffic stops
are “especially fraught with danger to police officers,”103 prohibiting citizens from
recording police activity during traffic stops is a restriction that would be
narrowly tailored to serve the government interest in officer safety. The same
would be true of a rule that prohibited the recording of police activity in a way
that would be likely to endanger or impede law enforcement officers while they
are engaged in their duties. Such restrictions would only be in effect when the
method used to record police activity poses a threat to the safety of the law
enforcement officials or their ability to carry out their legal duties. Thus, those
restrictions would be narrowly tailored to meet the compelling “legitimate and
weighty” interest that the government has in officer safety. 104 These restrictions
would likely have to come from individual States’ legislatures, however.
The argument that allowing people to record in public places infringes
upon the privacy of other citizens, especially those who were the subject of an
arrest and did not give consent, was one that was used by police for years in a
number of states when using wiretapping laws as a basis to arrest citizens who
recorded police activity.105 However, a First Amendment right to record in public
101

Id.
See Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110 (stating that it is “too plain for argument” that officer safety is
“legitimate and weighty.”).
103
Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1616, 191 L.Ed.2d 492, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 2807
(quoting Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323,330, 129 S.Ct. 781, 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009).
104
Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110.
105
Michael Potere, supra, 106 NW. U. L. Rev. 273.
102
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areas outweighs these privacy concerns because when in public, “one person’s
privacy collides with other peoples’ experience and memory.”106 Even
photographic or video recording does not implicate privacy issues because “this
amounts to nothing more than making a record, not differing essentially from a
full written description, of a public sight which any one present would be free to
see.”107
Taking this as a whole, it seems only a matter of time before the
recognition of a constitutional right to record police activity becomes wellestablished across all of the circuits. Over the past year, as levels of distrust in the
police have grown, it seems that citizens have been more prone to take out their
cell phones and record when they see something that they believe to be excessive
force or inappropriate police conduct. Allowing this as a constitutional right
would likely serve an important function as a check on police officers as they
carry out their official duties.
Additionally, granting citizens the constitutional right to record police
activity would probably also be beneficial to the states’ and police’s interests.
Although many departments are now beginning to implement body camera
programs, the body cameras do not capture everything about the officer’s
surroundings and therefore may not tell the full story when an officer gets
involved in an incident that draws public concern. If a citizen, standing at a safe
distance away is allowed to record the incident without the fear of being arrested
of having his or her cell phone seized, the surrounding circumstances are more
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likely to be recorded and could be used to absolve the officer of any allegations of
misconduct down the road. In an instance where a police officer did in fact
commit some form of misconduct or there are potential criminal charges, having a
video from a citizen that captures a more complete recording of the incident could
be beneficial to the attorneys in the case as well.
If citizens are concerned that they may be arrested or have their phones or
cameras taken away from them by the police for recording police activity in
public and from a safe distance away, this may cause hesitation to record or even
prevent it fully. This would cause more harm to the system than good. As a result
of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment rights to free
speech and the restrictions laid out by prior case law, courts should recognize that
the right to record police activity is a constitutionally protected right and not
allow for qualified immunity when an officer arrests a citizen or seizes a phone
from a citizen for exercising that right.
b. Right to Record Police Activity with a Drone
i. Use of Drones May Endanger Officer Safety or
Obstruct Investigation
The requirement that the recording and commenting on law enforcement
activity not endanger law enforcement officers is well served by allowing
recording by a handheld device, such as a cell phone, at a reasonable distance
away. However, it is not clear that this requirement is met when a citizen uses a
drone to record law enforcement actions from overhead, especially in a high
stakes situation.

234

Vol. 37.1

There is now “a wide and growing array of ever-more-sophisticated
drones […] readily available for purchase at hobby stores and on the internet.”108
Originally developed for use by the military, civilians and journalist have started
to use them as well.109 Drones cost just a few hundred dollars and “can
effortlessly be controlled from ordinary smartphones.”110 “As drone technologies
improve, the list of promising domestic uses for the devices continues to grow.”111
While Rivera may be one of the earlier cases where use of a drone to record
police activity was an issue, the number of cases litigating this matter is likely to
increase in the coming years. Thus, it would be prudent for the courts to adopt a
position on whether use of a drone to record police activity is a right that is
constitutionally protected under the First Amendment to the same extent as the
right to record police activity with a handheld device.
An officer on the ground when making an arrest or being engaged in a
stop of some other kind is charged with the task of controlling their environment.
While officers are trained to be aware of their surroundings, this task would
become significantly more difficult if the officer had to be aware of not only what
is going on around him or her, but also what is taking place in the air above.
While the argument could be made that a drone that is only equipped with a
camera to record what is transpiring below is not dangerous, law enforcement has
no way of actually knowing what capabilities a drone has from that distance. A
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general rule permitting citizens to use drones to record police activity from above
would be overbroad in that it would be possible for people to use drones that had
other capabilities as well.
Drones “are often heavy, powerful machines.”112 Further, drones are
generally electronic and operate on battery power. While hovering hundreds of
feet over a situation that is transpiring may not be inherently dangerous towards
law enforcement officers engaged in their official duties, there is always the
possibility that while one of these may lose power or run out of a battery charge
while flying over the officers. This could create a dangerous situation for the
officers, as the officers would be at risk of being hit, and possibly severely
injured, from a falling drone with gravity accelerating the speed of its fall over
hundreds of feet. This risk would also interfere with the performance of duties by
the officers because if a constitutional right to use drones to record police activity
from above was established, officers would need to constantly be looking up in
the air to make sure there is no drone falling at them. This would be distracting to
the officer from the duties that he or she is engaged in, and could cause more
mistakes or potentially allow a suspect to break free and escape or injure the
officer.
Even though the use of drones has only recently become more prevalent,
there have already been some reports of drone operated by civilians “crashing into
buildings [and] having hazardously close encounters with helicopters.”113 They
have “crashed into skyscrapers in Midtown Manhattan and [fallen] to a sidewalk”
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as well as “spun out of control and into the crown at a bull-running event in
Virginia.”114 Even just a couple of months ago, a drone fell from the sky in
California in pieces.115 One part of the drone hit an 11-month old baby girl as she
was being pushed in a stroller by her mother, causing a large bruise on her
forehead and a small cut on the side of her head. 116 When the owner was
interviewed by the police at the scene of the accident, he said that he had simply
lost control of his drone.117 About a week prior to that incident, a New York City
teacher was arrested after he crashed his drone into the empty seats at a U.S. Open
tennis match.118
These anecdotal stories illustrate the fact that it is highly possible for a
drone operator to lose control of the drone he or she is piloting. This would
definitely by an issue if the drone was hovering above police officers responding
to a call. If a police officer was engaged in the process of making an arrest or
rendering aid to an injured person, having a drone that may malfunction overhead
could pose a serious threat to the officer’s ability to carry out those tasks.
Additionally, an officer carrying out investigative tasks may be distracted from
those duties if he or she had a drone hovering overhead, due to the fact that it
could malfunction at any minute and come crashing down. Extending the
constitutional right to record police activity to a right to use drones to record
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police activity could put officers’ safety at risk and may impede ongoing
investigations.
Although denying the right to record police activity with a drone is
limiting the First Amendment rights, it is one that is narrowly tailored to meet a
compelling government interest. As stated above, the government has a
compelling interest in protecting the safety of its law enforcement officers. Given
the dangers that the use of drones to record police activity could pose, limiting
only the right to record by drone is sufficiently narrow that it would stand against
strict scrutiny.

ii. Use of Drones to Record May Not Be Lawful
Even if the use of drones to record police activity did not pose a potential
danger to the lives of police officers or have the potential to interfere with an
investigation, it would still likely fail to be recognized as a clearly established
constitutional right under a different analysis. The right to gather the news and
record may be completed by use of any source so long as it is done by lawful
means.119 Thus, if the recording is not done by a lawful means, it is not protected
by the constitution so a police officer or other official interfering with such
recording is not a violation of a constitutional right and there can be no § 1983
claim for such interference.
As drones have become more and more prevalent, one of the key issues
that has been repeatedly presented is how property laws will apply to the
119
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increasing use of drones. This includes how to determine whether or not a drone
is trespassing on private property based on its use. In many instances where there
have been disagreements over a drone flying in a particular place, it has been
unclear whether the operator of the drone was able to be held liable for such
operation.120 For the time being, there is no clear set of laws that apply to drones
so questions of liability remain largely unanswered.121 This means the legality of
a drone appearing in certain locations is also largely unestablished.
Originally, the common law rule was that whoever owned a certain patch
of land owned the air above the land as part of their property interest in the
land.122 Over time – and especially after airplanes, helicopters, and other related
machines were developed – it became clear that it was not feasible to allow a
landowner to have rights that reached all the way into outer space over the land
that they owned.123 Recognizing the common law rule would mean that anytime
an aircraft wanted to travel, it would be required to get an easement over the land
that it sought to pass over from each individual landowner.124 Such a practice
would have been impracticable, which is especially evident in modern times
where so many aircrafts travel long distances each and every day. In relation to
drones, this would mean that any drone operator who is sending his or her drone
over someone else’s land would need that person’s permission to pass over the
land prior to sending the drone on that flight. To combat this issue, the federal
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government instituted laws that allowed flights to be made within the “navigable
airspace,” which has been defined by regulations to mean airspace that is over
five hundred feet above the ground.125
The United States Supreme Court set out a landmark holding in United
States v. Causby in 1946 which provided further, albeit unclear, guidance as to
what rights the owner of a parcel of land has over the airspace above that land.126
The Causby family sued the government over a number of flights passing over
their land that were going from and coming to the airport that the government had
leased on an adjacent parcel.127 The lights and loud noises from the flights were
causing a panic among the chickens owned by the family, which led to the
chickens flying into the walls of their coop and dying. 128 The Causbys sued,
alleging that the low flights constituted an impermissible taking of their land by
the government and that they were entitled to just compensation under the Fifth
Amendment.129
The Court started by declaring that the common law rule that allowed
ownership rights to a landowner of all the airspace above his or her land defied
common sense and could not be said to have any reasonable application in the
modern world.130 In support of this finding, the Court pointed to the fact that
Congress had already passed the previously mentioned legislation permitting the
use of certain parts of the airspace by the public.131 The majority made clear that
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the owner of a parcel of land owned the space above the ground that the owner
could “occupy or use in connection with the land.”132 When the space above the
ground that can be occupied or used by the owner for some purpose in connection
with the land is invaded by another, that invasion has the same character as an
invasion of the ground itself.133 Thus, when the airspace above one’s land is
intruded upon by another the landowner may have a cognizable suit for trespass
against the invader, who then may be civilly or criminally liable.134
The holding in Causby, while recognizing that in some cases a landowner
may have a valid trespassing claim against another, limits the extent to which the
owner of a parcel of land owns the airspace above that land. 135 The common law
rule that the landowner alone owns the total airspace, extending into the
atmosphere, above their land no longer has any application.136 As a result,
airspace higher off the ground is not considered part and parcel of ownership of
the land below and therefore, others cannot be excluded by the owner from those
higher altitudes.137 Perhaps more importantly, and more relevant to the discussion
of drones, the Causby holding provided basis for the rule that a landowner does in
fact have the ability to exclude others from the airspace that is considered below
the navigable airspace levels.138
If a drone flies over a private landowner’s property within these lower
altitudes or hovers above them, the operator could potentially be liable for
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trespass. Thus, this would be an instance where the drone would be present in a
place where it does not have a lawful right to be. Since Houchins held that the
right to record is protected under the First Amendment so long as it is
accomplished by lawful means139, if a drone that is recording is in a place without
having a lawful right to be present then the drone would not be conducting its
recording by lawful means. Such recording would not then be protected by the
First Amendment. Whether a recording made by a drone is conducted lawfully,
from a place where the drone has a legal right to be, turns on whether or not the
airspace is in the public domain or is privately owned and subject to the right of
exclusion.
The Causby Court expressly declined to set a precise limit on how much
space above the surface but below the five-hundred foot navigable airspace line
could be considered the owner’s property.140 The only guidance provided by the
court was that the landowner could exclude others from the “immediate reaches”
of the land.141 The most specificity provided was that any part of the airspace that
the landowner was able to “occupy or use in connection with the land” would be
considered to be part of these “immediate reaches.”142 Also, as with most
traditional property rights, the owner of the land would be able to exclude any
type of invasion to the airspace above his or her land – but below the five-hundred
foot navigable airspace line – that would interfere with the owner’s full
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occupation or use of that airspace.143 Beyond this, there was no further guidance
as to how one is to determine what the immediate reaches of the land are. There
was no definitive test laid down as to how to determine what part of the land a
landowner could necessarily use and occupy, nor how much of the airspace
beyond the parts actively being used by the landowner would be considered to be
within the “immediate reaches” of the land. Additionally, the standard developed
in Causby is equally silent as to how one is to determine when a significant
interference to the airspace use is present as the result of an intrusion.
Which such ambiguous standards as to when an intrusion into the airspace
over a specific plot of land is unlawful, it seems impossible to say that there can
be a clearly established constitutional right to record police activity by drone. The
argument could be made that a drone that is recording police activity in one area
either passed through airspace owned by another or that it is hovering in a place
that it does not have a lawful right to be. In other words, it would be possible to
argue that any drone that is recording police activity is either currently trespassing
or has trespassed on its path to get to the location it is currently in. If these
arguments prevail, then the recording may have been obtained by unlawful means
since the drone violated the trespassing rules to get to its location, and thus the
recording would not be protected under the First Amendment.
This type of recording would be easily distinguishable from one where a
person is standing still in a public place to record by means of a handheld device.
At that moment, the person would be in a public space – somewhere where there
is a lawful right to be – and the recording would be taking place from that
143
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location. Whether a drone is in a place where it has a lawful right to be is much
more ambiguous, however, since that depends on whether the airspace is
considered public or subject to the control of a landowner. This ambiguity and
complexity as to whether a drone is in a certain place lawfully is illustrated by the
fact that there have been so many concerns and issues that have yet to be resolved
over whether the use of drones in various places can subject the drone operator to
criminal or civil liability.144
These issues have yet to reach the Courts of Appeals for determination in
relation to drones, and given the uncertain standard laid out by the Causby
doctrine the decisions that would follow from such cases would likely be far from
consistent. This issue is also compounded by the fact that the FAA and other
agencies, as well has Congress, have yet to pass laws and regulations specific to
drone operations. While airplanes are allowed to fly in the public domain of
“navigable airspace,” no similar promulgations have been made for the use of
drones.
Under property law, the use of a drone to record might not be considered
lawful depending on the space that it is occupying when such recording is made.
The way case law, laws on the books, and regulations currently stand, it is unclear
when a drone operator will be subject to criminal or civil liability for piloting a
drone in certain areas and when such operation will be considered lawful. As a
result, if a police officer were to interfere with or inhibit a drone from recording
police activity, the officer would likely be covered under qualified immunity from
a civil rights violation claim under § 1983.
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The right to record by drone is not a clearly established right under the
First Amendment because in order to fall under the blanket of recordings that are
protected, the recording must take place in a manner that is considered lawful.
Since the issue of when and where the use of a drone is considered lawful is still
largely undecided, it cannot be said that there is any clearly established rule as to
the lawfulness of recording by drone. As a result, it logically follows that if the
lawfulness of using a drone is not clearly established then the use of the drone to
record cannot be considered a clearly established protected right under the First
Amendment. Since the right is not one that is clearly established, qualified
immunity may be applied to protect the officers from § 1983 liability.

V.

CONCLUSION
The First Amendment protects the rights of citizens and the press alike to

engage in recording activity in public places as part of the freedom of expression.
This includes police activity. However, this right is rightfully limited by
constraining the right to record police activity in situations where it could be
dangerous to the officers engaged in their official duties. Accordingly, there
should not be a constitutional right to record police activity by way of drones, as
drones have the potential to cause harm and injury to police officers even if the
owner does not intend for them to. For the reasons outlined above, the
constitutional right to record police activity should be limited to recording by
handheld devices in situations that do not pose a risk to officer safety. Even if the
argument was made that the right to record police activity by use of a drone
should be considered a constitutional right, the ambiguity as to the lawfulness of
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use of a drone prevents such a right from being considered a clearly established
one.
Thus, a claim against a police officer under § 1983 should not be barred
by qualified immunity when the police officer interferes with or arrests a person
recording the officers engaged in their official duties from a place where the
person lawfully can be and by means of a handheld device when such recording
does not endanger the officers or interfere with the performance of their duties. A
claim against a police officer under § 1983 should, however, be barred against a
police officer who interferes with or arrests a person who is recording by means
of drone, at least under the current undeveloped laws and jurisprudence regarding
drones.

